ABSTRACT
This paper provides a complementary approach to the competition economics of Multisided Platforms (MSP). With the aid of a structured literature analysis, a final selection of 25 publications is used to examine the economic characteristics of MSP and their effect on dimensions of competition. The findings reveal several important regulatory implications. Assessing the network effects incorrectly, for example, or underestimating the interdependence between the price and demand can lead to an unduly narrow market definition. This alone makes it impossible to produce an economically viable appraisal of the multilateral market. Furthermore, when assessing the market power and the abuse of negotiation, exclusionary and concentration strategies, it is necessary to examine whether the influencing factors enhance or moderate the economies of scale of the multilateral markets. Lastly, an isolated orientation based on the price is inadequate as a competition parameter. Due to the great relevance ascribed to the role of data, it is appropriate to include this as a further competition parameter. In closing also managerial implications are outlined, presented by the example of “connected car” platform business models in the automotive industry. Reaching critical mass and the crucial value of cooperation and partnerships are emphasized.
Keywords
Multisided Platforms (MSP), competition, economic characteristics, regulation, antitrust; 9th amendment to the Act against Restraints of Competition (GWB)